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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Armed Seafarers on Board Ships: An Analysis from an
International Perspective
Degree:

M.Sc.

The dissertation is a study on the possibility of arming seafarers. The
objective of the study is to examine the methods and instruments that have been
employed to date and to observe the effectiveness and limitations of these tools in
the fight against piracy and maritime terrorism.
The issue of piracy does not seem to be receding as anticipated by the
global community. In the mind’s eye of the researcher, there seems to be much
controversy surrounding the very instruments that were adopted to control this
issue. It is possible that the surrounding controversy could be sparked from lack
of active actions, will or legal restraints. The dissertation reverts to the times
when merchant ships carried arms to fend off attackers; an analysis is done on the
arming of ship’s personnel, as well as, the associated risks and restrictions of such
practice.
Consequently the paper looks at the legal aspects of arming a ship’s
personnel. Since shipping is regulated by international soft laws, and since there
are no international enforcement for international maritime crimes, legal issues
fall under the purview of the jurisdiction of the flag states, or the states in which
the acts have been committed. Therefore, there may be legal implications
associated with arming of seafarers.
The author is of the opinion that the seafarers indeed face victimization
from many angles. Different proponents of maritime security have re-iterated the
ill fate of these noble artisans. It would seem that the most reliable defence would
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be self-defence. However, notwithstanding the hard truth, the author is of the
opinion that civilian seafarers should not be armed. The writer believes that the
negative consequences far outweigh the positives that could emanate from this
practice.

KEYWORDS:

Armed Seafarers, Maritime Security, Piracy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background

The hijacking of ships and seizure of their crew is one of the most common means
of gaining control over a vessel. Piracy has had devastating impacts on
stakeholders in the maritime arena for centuries. Ship owners have experienced a
myriad of losses resulting from ships being delayed, detained or destroyed,
expending monies for high ransoms for crew held hostages, rapid increase of
insurance premiums and in even more unfortunate cases, with the losses of lives.
Piracy can be dated as far back as the 800-146BC1. It consequently gained global
attention following the hijacking of the cruise vessel “Achille Lauro” in 1985. In
response to this incident, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
implemented the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereafter SUA), among other resolutions,
protocols and treaties to prevent unlawful acts which pose threats to the safety of
ships and security of crew members and passengers alike.2
For the past four decades industry players coupled with the International
Maritime Organization in a bid to find a practical solution to this menace. To date
many are still dissatisfied with the end results. The pertinent question, would be
what of the safety of the lives of the men and women who toil the uncharted seas
to provide the world with the necessities and luxuries it desires?
It must be appreciated that to reach a satisfactory solution, the root cause must
first be identified as eradication of a problem is more likely to be successful if the
root cause is terminated. However, the cause of on sea robbery is a compound
1

Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the Black Flag: A Brief History of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing
Group.
2
Pinto, C. A., Rabadi, G., & Talley, W. K. (2008). US port security. Maritime Safety Security and
Piracy”, Informa: London at Pg. 73
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issue. The issues for example range from cultural, political, economic and
technical disparities; these causes may be manifested in different places and in
varying periods of time.

3

Thus, one approach may not be the answer to

remedying this problem and all the varying causes must be duly eliminated.
One blatant cause of this on sea violence is the insufficiencies of the
international laws governing maritime security. The 1982 United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea (hereafter UNCLOS) and SUA Convention
have perceptible pitfalls which prevent their effectiveness in combating maritime
terrorism and piracy. In many instances the instruments are unable to expansively
capture the range of the crime, as well as, the jurisdiction to enforce the
conventions internationally.4

In light of the inadequacies of the tools being

employed in the fight against maritime terrorism and piracy, seafarers are left
vulnerable to attacks of all kinds. The pros and cons of arming a merchant ship
will be analyzed.
1.2. Purpose
The principal purpose of this paper is to examine the different measures
employed in the fight against piracy including the shortcomings of these methods,
as well as, the pros and cons of having armed seafarers on board ships.
Furthermore, the arming of seafarers will be justified under the existing
international laws on maritime security.
The qualitative research method is principally used in collating this
dissertation. The method was selected based on the type of information that will
be collected for this paper. It should be mentioned that this topic is quite
contemporary and as such the literature is somewhat limited on the direct arming
of seafarers, thus the hypothesis of this research was taken from a wide
3

Logina, A (2009), The International Law Related to Maritime security: An Analysis of its
Effectiveness in Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. WMU Publication
4
ibid
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standpoint. Additionally, the researcher has interpreted findings and provided
analyses and recommendations. The qualitative method focuses on gathering
information that is later analyzed in an interpretative, subjective, impressionistic,
or even diagnostic manner; hence, this proves to be the more suitable method to
adopt. Interviews were also carried out further to the qualitative research work.

1.3. Structure
The preparatory chapter will be followed by a historical overview of piracy in
which the background and root cause of piracy will be observed succinctly. The
paper will then briefly delve into specific tenets of SUA and UNCLOS, namely
the articles related to this topic, for example articles 101-107 and 110 of
UNCLOS as they directly speak about piracy and article 3 of SUA in relation to
unlawful acts. This is important as it will give rise to the main idea of the thesis,
as to why the option of directly arming seafarers could be explored.
The third chapter will provide a brief synopsis relating to arming of merchant
vessels in past times. The chapter will seek to identify who is deemed as a
seafarer under the principles of MLC 2006. This is imperative as it seeks to
determine whether the armed guards that are currently being used on board are in
fact considered as seafarers or whether there is a different definition for those
individuals. Additionally, the rationale behind this initiative of arming seafarers
will be looked at in context from the practical and legal context.
The fourth chapter looks at the underlying consequences associated with
arming the ship’s crew.
The final chapter will provide a brief summary, concluding remarks, as well
as, the author’s final view on the topic.
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While examples range from different States, in some instances, such as in
chapter III, cases are taken from the commonwealth countries such as Britain and
the United States. During the 1700 and 1750, the era of trade provided captivating
reasons for studying seamen. During this period Britain was one such country that
was actively involved in arming seafarers. In addition, this period witnessed the
evolution of the British Shipping industry, as well as, the astonishing expansion of
the American merchant marine.5

5

Rediker, M. (1989). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and
the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750. Cambridge University Press. Citing Karl Marx,
“The German Ideology” in Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (Moscow, 1969), vol. I,
59-60; Edgar Gold, Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and
Shipping Law (Lexington, Mass., 1981), 51, 61, 62
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CHAPTER II
HISTORIAL BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT STATUS ON
MARITIME TERROISM AND PIRACY
The challenges found in maritime security are the underlying reasons for
the various forms of protection now being introduced. These forms of protection
range from regional and international cooperations, as well as, the Best
Management Practices (BMPs) to name a few. Thus to understand the level and
types of protection needed for seafarers it must be justified what warrants the
necessary actions. For the past two decades, maritime security has gained
increasing consideration. Concerns for safety of vessels have always been on the
IMO’s agenda since the 1980’s but was later crystalized following the 1985
Achille Lauro incident and later the horrendous events of September 11, 2001 on
the United States.6 The most predominant threat facing ships and their crews
today is piracy and armed robbery7. The threat of maritime terrorism remains
largely a prospective problem.8 However since maritime terrorism still poses a
potential threat to the safety of crews and commercial shipping, it will be briefly
examined but here after the focus will be on piracy and armed robbery.

2.1. General Overview on Maritime Terrorism
On October 12, 2000, U.S Navy destroyer, USS Cole was attacked while
refuelling in the harbour of Aden, Yemen. The attack left 17 members of the crew

6

Mejia, M. (2003), Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and Other
Acts of Maritime Violence. Journal of International Commercial Law, 2(2), 153-175.
7
Schröder, J. U., Mejia Jr, M. Q., Mukherjee, P. K., Manolis, F. M., & Dreeßen, S. (2006).
Potential consequences of imprecise security assessments. IAMU Journal, 4(2), 31-38.
8
ibid
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dead, 39 suffering from wounds and extensive damage to their vessel.9
Subsequently, on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked and took control of 4
civilian aircrafts. These aircrafts were later used to destroy the World Trade
Centre, resulting in numerous causalities, fatalities and wreaking mayhem.10
One may question the link of on-land terrorists attack to that of on-sea
violence. Furthermore, the similarities and differences as well as, the links of
piracy and maritime terrorism may be questioned. The horrific events of
September 11 ignited the search for instances where terrorists could attack and the
possible objects that could be used as weapons. This led back to the sea and the
vast business of commercial shipping, as well as, the vulnerability of ships to
terrorists’ attacks. For example in 2002, the attack on oil tanker M/V Limburgh is
testimony to the vulnerability of commercial shipping to maritime terrorism11.
This could be an advanced step from the Achille Lauro incident in 1985.
Similarly, in 2004, the attack on Superferry 14 in the Philippines also concretized
the veracity of this threat. The connection is that maritime terrorism maybe
disguised as piratical attacks. Murphy states that, there have been speculations
about the realness of terrorist attacks on the world seaborne trade, specifically in
areas of raw materials and energy. Murphy wrote that these speculations can be
aligned with acts of piracy. An example can be drawn from the Dewi Madrim
incident. In October 2003, terrorists hijacked and took control of the chemical
tanker by emulating pirate techniques and attempted to navigate the vessel for an
hour. Murphy wrote that the attempts to navigate the ship resembled methods
used by terrorists who hijacked and flew the airplanes used in U.S 2011 attack.12
Thus it has been evidenced that terrorist operations on land has amplified at sea. In
9

The Navy Department Library, 2011, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for
Congress accessed from http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole_crsreport.htm
10
Murphy, M. N. (2013). Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to
International
Security.
Routledge.
accessed
from
http://www.google.se/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4USdYmCA_hQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=maritime+
terroism&ots=bV5wiUdYn1&sig=gArurN5aJpiqAVOa2Bwmu2Bv2Y&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=maritime%20terroism&f=false
11
ibid
12
ibid
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logical reasoning, crimes in a general sense over time progresses and improve to
meet criminals’ objectives. Therefore, in reality if terrorists can achieved their
goals through varied means such as by use of a ship, then realistically this would
be done. In furtherance, these criminal masterminds may also emulate the patterns
of pirates to gain access to a ship. This in turn poses additional risks to seafarers.

Maritime Terrorism and Piracy
Piracy

Maritime Terrorism

for personal gains

for political gains or insurgency

Legal and jurisdictional weakness

Legal and jurisdictional weakness

Favourable geography

Geographical necessity

Conflict and disorder
Under-funded law enforcement

Inadequate security
Secure base areas

Cultural acceptability

Maritime tradition
Charismatic and effective leadership

Permissive political environment

State support

Potential for reward

Potential for reward

Figure1. Conditions of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism (adopted: Martin Murphy, 2007)

Concluding Remarks
The prime differentiating factor between piracy and maritime terrorism is
that terrorism has a political objective while piracy has a financial motive, that is
the intention to plunder (animo furandi) or for the sake of gain (lucri causa)13.
Figure 1 provides a synopsis of the conditions needed for maritime piracy or
terrorism to thrive. Both have a common ground in potential rewards, as well as,
13

Mejia, M. (2003), Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and
Other Acts of Maritime Violence. Journal of International Commercial Law, 2(2), 153-175.
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jurisdictional and legal weaknesses. Murphy states, that wherever piracy or
maritime terrorism exist, one are more of these characteristics will be present14.
These characteristics can be used to compare or contrast the type of on-sea
violence that is emerging in a specific area. Hence, the correct preventative
measures such as employing BMPs or use of guards or navy can be implemented
to counteract the crime, protect seafarers and ship owners’ interests. In
furtherance, it can be concluded, based on the foregoing that maritime terrorism
can be confused with piracy and justifies the need to provide active measures of
combating the crimes.

2.2. Background and Historical Overview on Piracy
Background
In order to determine an action it is important to decipher the root of the
problem. It must be respected that if a root cause did not exist there would be no
need for preventative measures. Hence, the need to implement an active or
passive measure would be irrelevant. Piracy is the means to an end for some
people. It has been noted that piracy is built on the shoulders of economic
depression or rather it has been noted that regions lacking in economic growth
and sustainability are the areas that are more susceptible to such “on sea
robbery”.15

The longstanding history of lawlessness, poverty, unregulated and

unstable economy may be the root cause of maritime crime in the littoral states
and specifically in Somali waters. Somalia economic stability obliterated after its
14

Murphy, M. N. (2013). Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to
International
Security.
Routledge.
accessed
from
http://www.google.se/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4USdYmCA_hQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=maritime+
terroism&ots=bV5wiUdYn1&sig=gArurN5aJpiqAVOa2Bwmu2Bv2Y&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=maritime%20terroism&f=false
15
Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). Somali piracy: A Nasty Problem, A Web of
Responses. Current History, 108(718), 227-231., accessed on 8 April 2013 from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200722244/13D5678A36B6BE8700E/11?accountid=43722
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government collapsed in the early 1990s.16 Employment became scarce and other
developed nations pillaged off their livelihood. To survive, natives have turned to
the sea to commit unlawful acts. It is believed that the total eradication of piracy
has to be a consolidated effort at the national, regional and international levels,
taking into consideration the root cause of the problem.

Historical Overview
Scull painted black flags, wooden legs, patched eyes, hooked arms, long
beards and swords, were all mental images associated with ancient day pirates. In
the modern world, swords have been replaced with AK-47 automatic assault rifles
as the face of piracy changed. Piracy has been the “bête noire” of shipping since
the beginning of seabourne trade. Over the past three decades, piracy has
modelled many shapes and forms; different locations were affected in different
eras. For example there were pirate attacks against the boat people of Vietnam in
the 1970s, subsequently in the 1980s and 1990s there were the South China Sea
piratical attacks and finally in current times, Somalia and West Africa pirate
attacks. 17 Piratical activities can be grouped in the following eras.18
 The Greeks (800-146 BC)
 The Romans (753 BC - AD 476)
 The Vikings (AD 793-1066)
 The Buccaneers (1605 -1701)
16

Kontorovich, E. (2010). Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrorists, A. Cal. L. Rev., 98, 243. Accessed on 18 August, 2013, from:
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol98/iss1/6
17
Max Q Mejia Jr, Maritime Piracy: A Multi-dimensional Issue, 2012. Pg. 8
18
Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the black flag: A brief history of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing
Group.
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 The Barbary Pirates (1320-1785)
 The Tanka (Chinese) pirates (1709-1820)
 America and the Barbary Pirates (1785-1815)
A story of early piratical activity was the apprehension of young Julius
Caesar. He was captured by Cilician pirates while voyaging across the Aegean
Sea. The pirates required 20 talents for his release but the young Caesar felt
belittled and demanded that the value of his release be increased to 50 talents.19
The act of piracy was not restricted to western countries. In fact, records
can be found in support that the phenomenon existed in China as far back as the
Han Dynasty (106 BC - AD 220) and is believed to have existed prior to this time.
This phenomenon stretched to the 16th century and was driven by the
revolutionary milieus of the Ming and Qing empires. On the contrary, prior to the
colonial period it would seem as though piracy in West Africa never existed.
Perhaps at this time the state did not possess such disposition or maybe this time
in West African history was not properly documented. Early pirate ventures were
predominantly focused on affluence, but at the same time it had the intentions of
territorial acquisition as well. 20.
Two forms of piracy developed in the age of discovery with the race to
colonize the world. One form of piracy was solely for the purpose of plundering
while the other was for political gain. During the period of plundering, pirates
19

Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the black flag: A brief history of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing
Group pg 43
20
Antony, R. (2005). Piracy in Early Modern China. IIAS Newsletter, 36(7). accessed from
http://www.iias.nl/nl/36/IIAS_NL36_07.pdf/ Elleman, B. A., Forbes, A., & Rosenberg, D.
(2010). Piracy and maritime crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies. NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI. Pg. 37 accessed from http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Piracy-and-MaritimeCrime-NWC-2010.pdf
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rested in remote islands before and after conducting their raids. Libertalia was one
such pirate state located in Madagascar for more than twenty years21.

The

infamous Blackbeard (Edward Teach) was party to this form of piracy. He
dominated the Caribbean waters in the mid-1700s. The other form of piracy was
sanctioned by States. This was the period when Europeans fought against each
other to eliminate their competition and dominate a specific area. These pirates
were known as “corsairs” (French) and “privateers” (English).22 The difference
between the forms of piracy is that one was for personal gain while the privateers
or corsairs were pirates appointed by the State to practice piratical acts. Sir
Francis Drake and Sir Henry Morgan were two such pirates that were later
knighted and appointed Governor of Jamaica in 1674 by King Charles II23.

Weapons Used in Early Day Piracy versus Weapons Being Used Today
During the days of the sails, pirates utilized bladed paraphernalia such as
cutlasses, knives, daggers and malinspikes24/25 as weapons against their enemies.
These weapons were initially used as tools for sailing, for example, sharp knives
were used to cut ropes while malinspikes were used to separate knotted ropes.
Towards the end of the 18th century axes and tomahawks were introduced in
combats. The flintlock pistols were common during the Golden age of piracy

21

Birnie, P. W. (1987). Piracy: past, present and future. Marine policy, 11(3), 163-183. accessed
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308597X87900546
22
Risso, P. (2001). Cross-cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf Region During a long Eighteenth Century. Journal of World
History, 12(2), 293-319.
23
Birnie, P. W. (1987). Piracy: past, present and future. Marine policy, 11(3), 163-183. accessed
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308597X87900546
24
Malinspikes, where similar to an ice pick
25
Hamilton, J. (2010). Pirate Ships and Weapons. ABDO.
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(1660-1740)26. Compared to the golden age, modern day pirates are armed with
AK-47, semi-automatic rifles and grenade rocket launchers.27
Concluding Remarks
From the above text, it can be concluded that there have been changes
globally that have translated into modern day piracy. West Africa, a once docile
country is now one of the leading countries in this phenomenon. An underlying
reason for the piratical activities in this region today is due to the political and
economical instability of these littoral States. Kontorovich citing Jamal Osama
wrote “We are hungry. There is no Government. No economy. It is a good way to
earn money”28. It is important to note that the agenda of early days’ pirates is
different from modern day pirates, thus the will fuelling piratical acts is
correspondingly different. In the Anglo–American period (early 1700s), pirates
stemming from American and English crews for example were once sailors who
later became mutineers.29 Many of these men were sea and land military
strategists, some were privateers, knighted and sanctioned by their States to seize
countries in their names, but over time these servants became pirates as in the
case of William Kidd.30 The fundamental difference between pirates of 1700
milieu and pirates of the 21st century is that early days’ pirates mostly hailed from
powerful and wealthy nations. In that line, the choice to become a pirate may not
have emerged from desperation or on the basis of survival. In regions such as
26

ibid
Supra 14 at pp. 18
28
Kontorovich, E. (2010). Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrorists, A. Cal. L. Rev., 98, 243.citing Jamal Osma. Accessed on 18 August, 2013, from:
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol98/iss1/6
29
Rediker, M. (1989). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: merchant seamen, pirates and
the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750. Cambridge University Press.
30
Nutting, P. B. (1978). Madagascar Connection: Parliament and Piracy, 1690-1701, The. Am. J.
Legal Hist., 22, 202.
27
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Somalia, criminal syndicates were formed with the purpose to create opportunities
in order to survive; hunger, lack of political and economic support is the driving
power behind their actions.
In summary, the evolution of pirates and weaponries over time call for
more stringent measures in suppressing the crime. Modern day pirates are armed
with a different objective, as well as, equally powerful artilleries. Today, piracy,
“hostes humani generis” (the enemy of mankind) is acknowledged as a ferocious
crime that has the potential to disturb local communities, economies and the
world trade. The evolution of piracy has elicited concerns surpassing that required
in earlier times.

2.3. Current State of Piracy
In the 20th century, the known hotspots for piratical activities were South East
Asia (the Malacca Straits and South China Seas). In recent times the hottest piracy
spot in Africa was the Gulf of Guinea, specifically the waters off the Niger Delta
in Nigeria but since of late, the Horn of Africa has become the fore runner.
(figure 2 shows a high concentration of attempted attacks and hijackings in the
traditional pirate infested areas; figure 3 is illustrating international trends from
1990 to 2010 of the affected areas;31 while figure 4 is showing the extended pirate
infested areas in the Horn of Africa from 2005-2011).
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Figure 2. Map of Traditional Pirate Infested Areas. 32
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22

500
450
400
350

South East Asia

300

Africa
Indian Sub-Continent

250
America
200

Far East

150

Rest of World
Total

100
50
0
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991

Figure3. Pirate Incidents from 1990-2010 (Adopted from Geopolity, 2011) 33

The highly traversed Malacca Straits, South China Sea and Somali waters
were known for their high volume of pirate attacks annually,34 however, in 2011,
there were noticeable reductions in the frequency of these attacks especially in the
Somali regions. Pirate attacks fell from 163 in the first six months in 2011, to 69
in 2012; while vessel hijackings fell from 21 to 13.35 Whereas Somali waters have
seen a reduction in piratical activities, there has been a vast upsurge in places such
33
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as the Gulf of Guinea, where 32 incidents were reported in 2012 in comparison to
25 reported cases in 2011.36 (see figure 3 and 4).

Figure 4. A Map Illustrating Pirate Infested Areas in the Horn of Africa.37

The IMB declared the current number of attacks on ships in 2012 as 297 in
comparison with 439 in 2011. The organization reported that though there was a
36
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significant reduction in the numbers for the Somali region, there were obvious
increases in the attacks in the East and West Africa regions.38 The IMB
documented that on the worldwide scale, 174 ships were boarded in 2012, 28 were
commandeered while 28 were fired upon.39
An important question would be how accurate are the claims that piracy has
indeed taken a plunge? 40 The accuracy of information has a ripple effect. If it is
that piracy is indeed receding, then the need for aggressive response such as
arming of the crew whether directly or through the use of naval support or private
armed security guards would become unnecessary and would thereby justify the
use of the BMPs instead. Another element to observe is that while the crime has
seemed to dissipate in one area, it has manifested in another; thus the plague is
still embedded within the maritime arena and calls for active measures to eradicate
it.

As mentioned earlier, the root cause must be eliminated in order to

successfully rid the international community of the plague; is it that the economic
situation in Somalia has now been resolved? People must be economically viable,
given that the situation in these trouble areas remain the same, could it be possible
that the issue of piracy is not reduced but in a dormant period? Could it be that the
international community is also aware of this and could this be the rationale for
employing guidelines for the use of force and the use of armed security guards?
Support for this assertion can be found in Geopolity’s May 2011 report:
“the increase in piracy is likely to continue: the comparative economic benefits have
guaranteed a virtually unlimited supply of willing labour. Somali piracy is unlikely to be
eliminated solely through an increased foreign naval presence; only a restoration of
domestic stability and effective local governance can provide viable alternatives in the
long term. Since piracy remains by far the most lucrative option available to many
38
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Somalis—offering minimum earnings 67 times higher than the national average,
according to the most conservative estimates—it is unlikely to go away any time soon.
While the multilateral military presence has reduced the success rate of such hijackings,
they do not provide a sufficient disincentive to potential pirates”41
Indicator
Low/high pirate income (2010): Using 1,500
pirates
Potential lifetime earnings (2010): Using 1,500
pirates
Next best alternative
Pirate incomes compared to average income
Number of pirates could double by
Total cost of piracy 2010
Projected increase by 2014

Amount in USD
US$33,000 –US $79,000 per year
US$168,000 – US$394,000

US$500 per year
67 – 157 times higher
2016
US$4.9 – 8.3 billion
US$13 – 15 billion
Financiers, sponsors, officials, pirates,
Major stakeholders
maritime insurers, security companies,
navies, merchant marine.
Figure 5. Economic Indicators of Somali Piracy (Adopted from Geopolity)42

Concluding Remarks
Based on the documented information presented in figure 5, it would seem
as though the incentives to continue this on sea violence outweighs the
consequences. For example an annual earning for a native engaged in piratical
activity ranges from US$ 33,000 – US$ 79, 000, this translates to 67 to 157 times
more than the next best financial alternative would generate. If it is that piracy is
not anticipated to fully recede soon, or if it is anticipated that the incentives will
attract perspective pirates then this is another justification for arming seafarers.
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2.4. The Cost of Piracy
Victims of Somali Pirates in 2011

3,863 seafarers were fired upon by armed pirates. Numerous
ships and crews have suffered attacks, some multiple times.
Pirates are using increasing violence and firepower, often
directed at the bridge and living quarters.
968 seafarers came into close contact with armed pirates that
gained access to their vessels after the initial assault.
413 (44%) of these seafarers were rescued from citadels by
naval forces, often after waiting for hours or days in terror and
uncertainty about their fate as pirates actively fought to break
into the citadel
555 seafarers were attacked and taken hostage in 2011.
Those seafarers not rescued are kidnapped and held for
months without proper nutrition, access to medical care, or
communication with their families. They all suffered abuse
by pirates.

+
645 Hostages

14%
12%

31%

Captured in 2010
43%

Figure 6. The Human Costs of Piracy. (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy)43
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Of all the associated costs of piracy, the greatest of them all is the human
costs.

Reports revealed that in the year 2010, 4185 seafarers were attacked by

pirates with firearms while in 2011, 3862 seafarers were attacked. In 2011, 968
vessels were boarded by pirates compared to 1432 vessels boarded in the previous
year. Seafarers taken hostages totalled 555 in 2011 while in 2010, 1090 seafarers
were taken hostage (see figure 6 and 7). Furthermore it was reported that 1206
seafarers taken hostage were mistreated and in some instances extremely
abused.44 During 2011, 35 seafarers died after being held hostages died while 8
were killed by pirates after being taken captive, a further 8 died from disease and
malnourishment while being held captive; and 19 died while being used as
human shields during hostage rescue efforts.45
Nature

2010

2011

Seafarers attacked by

4185

3862

1432

968

1090

555

pirates with firearm
Seafarers on vessel
boarded by pirates
Seafarers taken hostage

Figure 7. Seafarers Attacked in 2010 and 2011. (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy)46

It is worthy to note that even in the absence of physical suffering or loss of
lives, the trauma endured by a seafarer who has fallen victim to the grips of piracy
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is immeasurable. The trauma is not contained to the seafarer but extends also to
his or her family.

Total Estimated Cost of Piracy
The total estimated costs for piracy in 2012 totalled $5-6 billion dollars for
industry players and $1.09 billion dollars for government. The cost to provide
armed security guard services amounted to 1.5 billion versus military operations
of $1.09 (see figures 8 and 9 for a breakdown of the costs)
The military costs of $1.09 billion included, the fee for scouting aircrafts
and unmanned vehicles, vessel protection detachment, naval operations,
administrative naval budget charge, as well as, costs for Shared Awareness and
De-confliction (SHADE) meetings.
In 2013, the Danish Government reported the safe release of the crew of
M/V Leopard but refused to reveal the pay-out amount in fear that it would
become a bench-mark figure in possible future hostage situations.47 In 2012,
$31.75 million dollars were expended in ransom pay-outs to Somali pirates.
Other costs to industry players included the cost for security equipment,
totalling $1.65-$2.06 billion; re-routing costs amounting to $290.5 million;
increase speed cost totalling $1.53 billion; prosecution and imprisonment fee
equalling $14.89 million, armed security guards totalling 1.5 billion, while
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insurance and counter piracy organization costs amounted to $634.9 million and
$24.08 million respectively.48
Industry Players
Government
$5-6 Billion Yearly
$1.09 Billion Yearly for military operations
$13.6 -16.4 Mil per day
$2.9 Mil per day
Figure 8. Comparative Cost of Piracy between Government and Industry Players49
Military
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Operations,
Recoveries,
1.09 Billion
31.75 Million

Counter-piracy
Organziations
Cost, 24.08
Million

Armed Guards,
1.5 Billion

Re-routing, 290.5
Million

Security
Equipment 1.652.06 Billion

Increased Speed,
1.53 Billion

Insurance Cost,
634.9 Million

Labour Cost,
471.6 Million

Prosecution &
Imprisonment
Cost, 14.89
Million
50

Figure 9. Costs of Piracy (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012)
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Concluding Remarks
The inhumane treatment of seafarers, coupled with the rising costs of
piracy, justifies yet another reason why directly arming seafarers could possibly
prevent being captured in the first instance much more being subjected to such
hostilities and abuse while being held captives.

2.5 Instruments Used In the Suppression of Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts
The IMO in addition to its 1988 SUA Convention and 1982 UNCLOS, in
2004, finalized the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), with sixteen (16) countries
being party to the agreement. Also in July 2004, the IMO amended the 1974
Convention on the Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS) to supplement as the
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. Under SOLAS, piracy is
threated as acts of terror with minor differences.51 January 2009, saw the
regulatory body initiating high-level meetings to discuss the Djibouti Code of
Conduct. The instrument spoke to the suppression of armed robbery against ships
in the West Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Similarly to RECAAP, the
instrument seeks to establish regional cooperation between various countries by
sharing information on piratical activities.52

Other cooperations include the

United States Coordinated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), NATO’s
Operation Ocean Shield and the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR

50

Accessed on 19 September, 2013 from http://feraljundi.com/4241/maritime-security-thesecurity-costs-of-piracy-for-2011/
51
Mejia M (Jr.) (2006). Coastal Zone Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at Sea, pg. 111-114
52
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, International Maritime Organization, Retrieved 17
April, 2013 from www.imo.org

31

Operation Atalanta which are the three foremost multinational task forces
operating for the suppression of piracy.53
This section will briefly observed the two main instruments UNCLOS and
SUA for the reason that all other legal framework used in combating or
suppressing piracy and armed robbery has UNCLOS at its core. According the
Kraska and Wilson, the legal framework in the fight against maritime piracy is
formed amidst the organized responses of maritime law with UNCLOS at its
centre.54 Furthermore since the focus of this dissertation is not on the anti-piratical
tools, the main provisions directly giving rise to this topic will be examined.

1982 UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened
for signature on the 10th of December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica and entered
into force in 1994. The Convention sought to codify rules in a bid to subdue acts
of piracy. 55 To date over 166 countries have ratified56 UNCLOS. Thus the efforts
to create uniformed rules globally in the suppression of piracy had a wide level of
acceptance. The principal limitation with UNCLOS however, is the ancient
definition of the term piracy. As mentioned before, piracy has long changed its
face. The evolution of piracy, the modus operandi of pirates and the nature of the
53
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crime has become sophisticated. As such the instrument’s archaic definition of
piracy does not capture the contemporary image of the crime. Piracy as defined
under article 101 is:
a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or private aircraft, and directed
a. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board such ship or aircraft;
b. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state;
b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b)”57
The geographical location of piracy has relocated from the high seas to
coastal areas. With this current repositioning, the definition of piracy under
UNCLOS has lost its ability to capture the modern nature of the crime, since the
act must be committed on the high seas to be recognized under international law
as piracy.58 For example, pirate attacks have taken place as close as 11.55 nautical
miles away from shore however, under the current definition this would not be
considered as piracy.59
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Another notable detractor is that attempted attacks are not classified as acts
of piracy. Acts of piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS consists of “any illegal
acts of violence, detention or depredation…”60 Depredation according to the
Oxford online dictionary means “an act of attacking or plundering”. The provision
was not specific in including attempted attacks. Thus under article 101 of
UNCLOS, if attackers attempted to board a vessel but were deterred by actions of
the crew, then the definition of piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS does not
specifically include this act of attempt.61
Further limitation with the definition of piracy is the “two ship rule”.
UNCLOS refers to piracy as an act committed by the crew or passengers of a
private ship against another ship, or against persons or property on board such
ship. Experts such as Murphy and Menefee have argued that the lines of this
article are unclear. Menefee puts forward an argument counteracting this
limitation; one argument resulted from the interpretation of UNCLOS 101 (a).62
Menefee contends that both parts of article 101(a) of UNCLOS are conscripted
differently63. Menefee states that the second part of the article 101 (a) of
UNCLOS does not speak of the “two-ship rule” while the first part of article 101
(a) of UNCLOS64 stated that “piracy is an act directed against a ship, persons or
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property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state”65 Logina wrote “under
such construction it turns out that in places outside the jurisdiction of any state
takeover of a ship from within is piracy, but on the high seas it is not piracy” 66 In
furtherance, Logina went on to explain that the difference in approach to the high
seas and the places outside the jurisdiction of any state seems not to have any
foundation. Logina concluded that an assumption could be drawn that the intent
of the drafters was to “apply the “two ship rule” for both territories, or not apply
the “two ship rule” for both territories”. Furthermore, Logina stated that either this
was the intention of the drafters or perhaps the scribers had made an error in
constructing these lines of article 101 (a).
Further to this interpretation of the “two ship rule” it is presumed that if
the ship was accessed by stowaways who subsequently gained control over the
vessel, then this would not be considered as piracy. 67 An example of this nature is
the case of Achille Lauro. On October 10, 1985, four Palestines boarded a ship as
normal passengers. Upon being discovered that they were transporting heavy
armament they took control of the ship as she was Sailing form Alexandria to Port
Said. The Palestines killed American passenger Leon Klinghoffer and threw his
body over board after their requests to dock at Tartus was refused. 68 The Achille
Lauro incident did not include two ships, hence under the provision this act would
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have not been considered as piracy. This incident however gave rise to the SUA
Convention.
Coming back to present day, pirates often times use skiffs to go alongside
ships while attempting to board the vessel. Hypothetically, if these pirates board
this ship and took control of the vessel and crew, would this not be considered as
acts of piracy? Or would the skiff be considered as a ship, thereby conforming to
the “two ship rule.”

1988 SUA Convention
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) was entered into force on the
1st of March 199269. The principal purpose of the SUA Convention was to ensure
that suitable actions were taken against persons who committed unlawful acts
against ships. Since this dissertation is an analysis on arming of seafarers, two
prominent issues is the fact that the SUA Convention did not speak of armed
robbery or piracy, nor did it defined or justified what were deemed unlawful acts
or spoke of unlawful acts in the text. Lastly, the SUA Convention does not deem
the murdering of persons on board as an impediment to the safe navigation of the
ship.
Logina noted that the SUA Convention did not speak of armed robbery or
piracy; rather it addressed offences as unlawful acts.70 However, the wording
used in the document did not speak of unlawful acts but rather of offences as so
69
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listed under article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, the deduced conclusion is that
the unlawful acts to which the preamble and title spoke of, are the offences listed
in article 3 of SUA.71

Since the SUA Convention did not define the term

“unlawful act”, but instead provided a disclosed list (tenets of article 3) which
falls under this notion, the phrase is subjected to interpretation. For example what
may be considered as lawful in one State, may be unlawful in another. Therefore
this would create a loophole and may prove hard to indict persons on these
grounds of committing an “unlawful act”.
Kraska and Pedrozo wrote that since the SUA Convention was intended to
subdue acts against the safety of maritime navigation, under article 3 paragraph 1
(g), it would suggest that “injuring or killing of a passenger on a seized vessel that
did not endanger the ship’s navigation should not be included in the treaty,
whereas injury or killing that does endanger the ship’s navigation is already
covered under paragraph 1(b) (an act of violence likely to endanger the ship’s
navigation).”72 Kraska et al cited Halberstam, stating that the intentional injury or
homicide of a person on board the ship was a different and distinctive offence, not
simply an aggravating situation of seizing the ship.73 In furtherance, Kraska and
Pedrozo explained that failure to include “injury or murder as a separate criminal
offence”, as opposed to an aggravating circumstance of another crime, might
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exclude using it as the basis for extradition under the Convention, weakening the
entire structure of “extradite and prosecute”.74
In concluding Kraska et al explained that while murdering a passenger
does not necessarily jeopardise the safety of the ship, the main reason for
defending the vessel is to secure the persons on board.75
The justification for briefly examining these two Conventions, SUA and
UNCLOS, is that these Treaties were drafted to suppress unlawful and violent
acts at sea. If the Conventions did not have the noticeable pitfalls, then perhaps
they would have successfully achieved their mandate. However, since the
Conventions are lacking in pertinent areas needed to ensure the protection of
seafarers and passengers alike then is also gives rise to the arming of seafarers.
It should be noted that both SUA and UNCLOS lack consistency for trial
and penalty processes. Thus the process for trial and penalty is determined by
municipal laws which differ across countries. In order to ensure that offenders
are punished, there needs to be standardization in handling of criminals as this
would allow states to be confident with their resources for apprehending pirates
and ensuring that efforts are not futile.76 In countless instances pirates are
captured, but released after a few days. The reason being that international laws
are soft laws and is not enforceable; the only enforcement comes when these laws
are included in the national laws of States. For example, Canada is one such State
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that has recognized the loopholes with the SUA Convention. To fill the gaps, the
government of Canada has enshrined criteria in their municipal laws.77

2.6. Best Management Practices & its Effectiveness
In May 2011, the Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-ninth session
adopted the resolution MSC.324 (89) on the Implementation of Best Management
Practice Guidance.78 The Best Management Practices (BMPs) is a list of
guidelines to assist in evading, daunting or suspending pirate attacks in high risk
areas79, for example in the Arabian Gulf. Furthermore, the BMPs include
measures such as evasive manoeuvring to ensure ship safety. Other
recommendations given to deter pirates ranged from physical barriers such as
razor wires, electrified barriers, water spray and foam monitors, security alarm
systems, use of closed circuit televisions, safe muster points and safe lock
citadels.80
The best management practices were established to work in conjunction
with the assistance of naval support. The idea being that hijacked ships could rely
on the naval vessels to rescue and secure the crew against being held as hostages.81
In some instances, the best management practice approach achieved its mandate as
in the case of MV Magellan Star. On 8th of September, 2010, the MV Magellan
Star, a German Container Ship, flagged by Antigua and Barbuda, was sailing in
77
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the Gulf of Aden. It is important to note that the ship was being escorted by
United States Naval Forces; however, they became separated during the course of
voyage; during this time, the vessel was hijacked by pirates. Luckily, all members
of the crew were able to secure themselves in the safe haven until naval support
came, disarmed the pirates and safely handed back the ship to its Captain.82
Some important questions to answer are:


Why is the best management practices used?



Can weapons be deterred by a paper bound document?



Who is in charge of protecting the vessel, whether flag state or ship owner

In the author’s opinion, the BMPs serve as an interim solution, since the
eradication of on–sea violence needs to be corrected from a political, technical and
economic standpoint. In a meeting with Martin Conroy,83 he stated that the BMPs
are low cost methods that allow companies to appear to meet their responsibilities
without expending monies. Conroy stated that for the BMPs to be effective there
has to be a continuum that is determining when the passive methods will work and
knowing when to apply lethal force. Conroy explained using an example that the
BMPs by itself would not be sufficient security measures for a ship going through
Kuwait. A follow-up question would be whether the BMPs are a communication
campaign. Since ships are still being attacked and seafarers taken hostage, this
provides an indirect answer that a paper bound document (BMPs) cannot deter the
armed attacks of pirates. Support for is in the case of MT Samho Jewelry.
“MT Samho Jewelry, a 19,609-ton product tanker carrying chemicals, was
Maltese flagged, Norwegian owned, and operated by South Korea's Samho
Shipping. It had a crew of 21, including Burmese, Indonesians, and Koreans. On
82
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the morning of 15 January 2011, the ship was situated in the Arabian Sea, en
route from the United Arab Emirates to Sri Lanka when the ship was seized by
Somali pirates. The crew activated the ship’s security alert system and withdrew
to the citadel but within three hours the pirates had destroyed the hatch and had
taken the crew hostage. Some of the hostages were beaten, and one reported that
he lost several teeth.”84

As mentioned before, the BMPs were intended to work along with the
support of the naval forces, since a coalition of naval support may not always be
reliable. The question of proximity comes into play. How can the crew be assured
that help will be rendered in times of distress? The issues of jurisdiction will also
be tested. Even though numerous warships have been deployed in these high risk
areas, they may choose to operate independently due to sovereignty issues and as
such some naval forces are organized to protect their countries’ shipping interests.
States such as Netherlands, Russia, India and Japan have done this in the past.85
Support for this assertion is given citing Martin86, he stated that military protection
is not reliable as the State does not work for ship owners. Martin continued saying
“if the military has communicated that they will meet a vessel at the Suez Canal
and for unforeseen reasons the ship has been delayed, then the navy may not wait
on the ship” seen as the military work on their own time and schedule and works
under the jurisdiction of their sovereign states.
In this same vein lies another challenge for the effectiveness of BMPs,
which is the scarcity of warships. Approximately 50,000 vessels traverse the
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Malacca Straits yearly carrying an estimated one third of the world’s trade,87 while
20,000-30,000 ships ply through the Gulf of Aden annually; it becomes almost
impossible to provide the corresponding number of warships needed to escort
these vessels through these high-risked areas.88
Concluding Remarks
It would seem as though the total effectiveness of the BMPs is hampered
by the inability to provide equally matching number of warships in the high risk
areas. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, the cost to maintained naval
support runs the government an annual budget of approximately 2 billion United
States dollars. In addition it costs the industry over 5 to 6 billion annually to
maintain security presence for their ships. Furthermore some nations have a
stronger military presence in the high risk areas but may prefer to only protect
ships under their flag. The cost of military presence on the seas is high as seen in
chapter 2.4, what if the government should decide to pass this cost on to industry
players, coupled with their existing budget? The cost of piracy may become
extravagantly high for ship owners and operators who may shy away from
providing vessel protection. If this should happen, the question of who will pay or
ensure that seafarers are protected is very important. Article 94 of UNCLOS
reads89.
“every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
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(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews,
taking into account the applicable international instruments;
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the
prevention of collisions”90
On this basis it can be assumed that flag states is responsibility for
ensuring that ships that fly their flags are protected. Furthermore according to
article III of the MLC 2006, “every seafarer has a right to a safe and secure
workplace that complies with safety standards”91 In addition, Regulation 5 of the
MLC 2006 states that it is each Member’s

responsibility to enforce and

implement the articles and rights set forth in the text of the document. Therefore
seen as the seafarer is entitled to a safe and secure working environment, and seen
as the flag state is deemed responsible for ensuring all rights are reinforced, it can
be assumed that it is the flag state’s duty to ensure that ship-owners provide a safe
and secure working environment. Since the term “safe and secure” was used in a
general sense in both the MLC 2006 and UNCLOS, it can be interpreted that this
means safety and security in every general sense. However, under the tenets of
article 94 of UNCLOS, the flag state still has a responsibility to also provide
protection.
This comes back to the question of “ability to protect” and the use of
“Flags of Convenience”. If it is that flag states are expected to provide safety and
security what of the small flag states such as Antigua and Barbuda, Panama, to
name a few that lack the capability to protect the ships they have flagged? This
would go back to point zero and the seafarers would be left again without added
protected and once more would justify the possibility to arm seafarers.

90

UNCLOS [1982]
Maritime Labour Convention 2006, International Labour Organization Treaty hereafter MLC
[2006]
91

43

2.7. Combating Piracy by Having Guns On board Ships
There are no explicit laws forbidding the arming of merchant vessels,
whether arming by means of contracted armed security personnel, the direct
arming of seafarers, or security through the use of military forces. In 2009, the
IMO and the international arena strongly opposed this option supposedly due to
the plethora of legal and other underlying liabilities. Subsequently, BIMCO
moved to create GUARDCON. GUARDCON supports a more active response to
piracy by providing contract security services to ship owners. This strategy,
however, gives overall responsibility to the Master. This active approach was not
readily embraced as it refutes article 34.1 under SOLAS, which states that the
Master92 should not be restricted to resolve incidents which relate to safety of life
and the protection of the environment.
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Though the IMO initially expressed that

they did not endorse seafarers carrying firearms nor did they encouraged the use of
privately armed security personnel; the IMO however, follows the trend of the industry,
thus in94 in May, 2011, at its eighty-ninth Maritime Safety Committee Session, the

Committee approved an interim guidance to ship owners, ship operators and
shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board
ships in the High Risk Area95.
United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, David Cameron declared and openly
demonstrated Britain’s support for the use of armed security personnel. He stated
that “pirates are succeeding at holding the world at ransom”. In this vein he
challenged the maritime fraternity to respond with much vigour. It would seem
92
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that many countries, contrary to what they professed, welcomed this new change
as they began to authorize their merchant vessels to carry weapons or hire armed
guards under the umbrella of self-defence. Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America are some countries that took the lead in this
initiative, while others such as Germany, Malta, Cyprus and India are undergoing
policy changes in this regard.96
In the researcher’s point of view these actions would have seemed to
recognize the limitations of the instruments used in supressing piracy and armed
robbery. In furtherance, it seemingly demonstrates the acknowledgment that the
BMPs are not forceful enough to repel these unlawful acts. Or could it be that the
call for more “vigour” from David Cameron and other influential countries
sparked this response? Nordquist; Wolfrum; Moore and Long wrote:
“It should be common place that security at sea is to say the least
challenged by numerous threats. If not countered appropriately, these
threats will inevitably limit our economic sustainability, as well as our
capabilities to continue using the world’s oceans for security operations.
Especially in Europe, some political leaders neither recognize the
importance of the sea, nor are they willing to take decisions necessary for
an effective and efficient preservation of maritime security. All too often
they are seconded by legal experts who claim that maritime security
operations, while certainly necessary are contrary to international law.
Thus, the law is being abused as a cheap excuse for passivity while, in
reality, it is a lack of political will and courage that prevents the necessary
steps from being taken.” 97
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Industry players believed that passive approaches were best in the fight
against piracy as they do not aggravate an already escalated situation98. For
example, it was mentioned that if seafarers attempted to defend themselves and
fail, this could lead to them feeling the “wrath” of the pirates. In the researcher’s
point of view, the passive methods could also elicit this wrath and can be equally
dangerous. Seafarers using the cannons or hoses to spray water in an attempt to
deter pirates from coming abroad are opened to being injured by pirates while
employing this technique. It is believed that pirates would become agitated by any
means of deterrents and will react accordingly. The case of M/V Theresa is a
classic example, where a North Korean Captain was fatally shot after firing a flare
gun in wake of an impending pirate attack.99

In other cases, victims have

cooperated fully and still were taken hostages; as in the case of the owners of the
Lynne Rival.100
As seen in the previous cases, the sanctuary of citadels has failed in the
past and seafarers have been beaten and taken hostage. It is also noted that it is
becoming a trend for pirates to set fire to ships when they cannot locate the
crew.101 It is believed that this method also poses a great danger to seafarers who
are locked away in a dark, stifling narrow citadel. In addition, it was mentioned
that some vessels carry combustible products making the fear of arming even
higher in wake of possible fireballs in a gun battle. Again if pirates set fire to the
vessel, the effect will be just the same.
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It is believed that active defence should be left to the militaries but as
aforementioned, the ratio of warship to merchant ships is not equal. Once again
these vessels will be left susceptible to piratical hijackings. All of the aforesaid
may be reasons justifying the arming of seafarers.
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CHAPTER III
ARMING OF SEAFARERS
3.1. Historical Overview of Arming of Merchant Ships in the Past
It was common place for merchant ships to be armed in the 1700s.102 One
reason for arming was for the protection of trade and commerce.103 In the 19th
Century Britain was one such country that used arms on board their merchant
ships for protecting its cargo. McCurdy wrote the following:
“The right of a merchant ship to defend itself against capture by the enemy in
time of war was never doubted. The carrying of guns for defensive purposes was
a common practice in the British merchant service during the Napoleonic wars.
As late as 1855, the ships engaged in the opium trade were armed for the
protection of their valuable cargo against pirates and others.”104

The renewal of this policy on the part of British Admiralty was announced
by Sir Winston Churchill on the 17th of March 1914 in the House of Commons.
Sir Churchill explained the grounds on which merchant ships could be armed:
“They are armed solely for defensive purposes. The guns are mounted in the
stern and can only fire on a pursuer. These vessels are not privateers or
commerce destroyers in any sense. They are, however, thoroughly capable of
self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantman. The fact of their being so
102
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armed will probably prove an effective deterrent alone on the depredations of
armed merchantmen and an effective protection for these ships and for the vital
supplies that they carry.”105

Though this practice started solely to protect Britain’s interest at the time,
it was also explicitly stated that it aimed to protect against acts of piracy and
others. Thus it is evidenced that arming merchant ships against acts of piracy was
a method used in the past. Notwithstanding, the perceptions on arming merchant
ships have almost always attracted the same response. Subsequent to Britain’s
admiralty, major shipping companies, though they refused to comment, readily
expressed their patriotism to the United Kingdom by agreeing to this policy.
Some ship owners and jurists from neutral states were not in favour of this
proposition. It was their belief that the proposal was divergent to the Declaration
of Paris106, as well as, the expanded burdens and operations such decision would
have had on naval welfare. Evidence of such opposition came in form of letters
from neutral countries such as Belgium, Holland, Norway and Sweden.107
German Jurists denied the rights of merchant ships to bear arms on the
basis of self-defence. Following a meeting at the Institute of International Law at
Oxford in 1913, article 12 of the Manuel des Lois de la Guerre Maritime108 was
adopted. Article 12 (translated by the writer. See original format in footnote 102)
read:
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“the race is prohibited....... public ships and private vessels, and their staff
cannot deliver acts of hostility against the enemy. Permission is granted to each
other to use force to defend themselves against the attack of an enemy ship.”109
The position of arming vessels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
traces back to present day and to the topic of this dissertation. It can be concluded
that arming of merchant ships was a practice of the past. The pertinent questions
would be why this practice was ceased and whether it is time to revert to the once
practiced method.
The Disarming of Merchant Ships
Based on the foregoing, it was mentioned that Britain’s reason for arming
their merchant ships was for protecting trade against attacks from other merchant
ships and against pirates. Britain maintained that their vessels were not equipped
with armament to partake in any acts of war. As such neutral countries like the
United States, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Sweden admitted armed British
merchant ships in their ports. In 1914 however, Mr. Winston Churchill further
informed that in addition to the existing 1000 armed merchant ships, they would
be adding 2000 more armed vessels, some of which were equipped with guns
used by naval crews. This revelation surfaced questions of whether the ships’
arms would be viewed as defensive arming or offensive arming and whether they
would be mistaken for belligerent ships and as be attacked and sunken by
submarines. On January 18, 1916, Mr. Lansing of the United States wrote to the
British Government proposing the disarming of U.K’s merchant ships. The
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communique proposed that since pirates and privateers were no longer traversing
the main commerce channels there were no longer need for arming. In the 1950s
British merchant ships were duly disarmed.110
Concluding Remarks
The disarming of merchant ships was attributed to the decline in
privateering and piratical activities. Seen as the crime of piracy among others
have resurface perhaps it is time to revert to the old practice of arming merchant
ships and sailors once more.

3.2. Determining Who Should Be Armed
Determining Who Should be Armed Based on the MLC
It is of paramount importance that it is established who should be armed.
Seen as there is strong resistance against the direct arming of seafarers, it needs to
be ascertained whether the armed security forces are considered as seafarers. The
definition of a seafarer as so stated under article 2 subparagraph 1(f) of the
Maritime Labour Convention 2006, defines a seafarer as “all persons who are
employed or are engaged or work in any capacity on board a ship to which the
Convention applies”.111 The new definition of a seafarer under the MLC was
extended to include persons who worked on board ship for example hairdressers
and doctors. However, article 2 paragraph 3 of the MLC states that in the event of
doubt in determining who is a seafarer, the competent authority in each Member
state, after consulting with the ship owners’ and seafarers’ organization can make
110
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a decision to deem a person as a seafarer.112 It should be noted that a government
by itself cannot decide who is deemed a seafarer.

Determining Who Should be Armed Based on ILO Resolution No. 185
The ILO Resolution No. 185 adopted at its 94th Maritime session on
February 22, 2006, in Geneva states that “there are persons who principally work
onshore, but occasionally spend a short period on working on a ship. These may
not be seafarers; there are persons who regularly spend a short time period on a
ship. These may be seafarers.113 The 2006 ILO Resolution provides these criteria
to resolve the doubts when deciding who should be considered as a seafarer:


The duration of the stay on board of the persons concerned



The frequency of periods of work spent on board



The location of the person’s principal place of work



The purpose of the person’s work on board



The protection that would normally be available to the persons
concerned with regard to their labour and social conditions to
ensure they are comparable to that provided for under the
Convention114

The MLC 2006 definition seemingly creates a grey area as to whether or
not armed security forces personnel can be considered as seafarers. Liz
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McMahon’s article, published on Lloyd’s on May, 2013, voiced concerns with the
MLC 2006 definition of a seafarer:
“Ship owners and private maritime security companies have voiced concern over
moves by the Maritime Labour Convention to class armed guards as seafarers,
questioning how this will work in practice. When the MLC comes into force in
August, security personnel deployed on ships could be classed as seafarers if they
meet the definition outlined in Article II.1 of the convention.
If the matter is unclear, it may be left to the individual flag administration to
decide whether it considers the guards to be seafarers. Industry watchers have
urged flag administrations making that call to consider factors such as duration of
the guards’ stay on board, frequency of work on board, the location of his or her
principal place of work, the purpose of that work and protection cover for labour
and social conditions though a final decision has not been made on whether
armed guards would be classified as seafarers, early indicators suggest that this
will be the case.”115

If armed security guards are indeed considered as seafarers based on the
definition given by the MLC 2006, then armed seafarers would have already been
on board ships. Hence, the other distinction that must be made for the purposes of
this paper is who to arm; whether be it a military seafarer, privately armed
security guards or civilian seafarers. The following sentences define a seafarer in
the author’s view.
Oxford online dictionary defines “military” as “armed forces of a
country”116 Therefore, the writer’s definition of a military seafarer, is a seafarer
who has undergone military training and who has been placed on board ships by
their States for protecting civilian seafarers and ensure the safety of the vessel.
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Privately armed security guards are persons who have undergone artillery training
and are so certified to carry and use arms if necessary. It should be noted that
private security guards can also be unarmed. These persons are normally joined to
a security company and provides on board security services similar to the services
of shore-based security guards.
Civilian as defined by Oxford online dictionary is a person who is not a
part of the armed forces or police force.117 Therefore civilian seafarers are those
individuals who have complied with the STWC requirements and have been
deemed and certified as able bodied seamen and officers. In this research, the
writer intends to evaluate the arming of civilian seafarers. It is important to justify
hereafter, whether these civilian seafarers have a right to bear arms to protect
themselves.

Difference between Military, Private Armed Security Guards
The distinguishing difference between military personnel and privately
armed security personnel is that militaries are commissioned by the flag states. A
military personnel providing security assurance on board takes orders from the
states and not from the captain as per regulation 34.1 of SOLAS. Seen as the
Captain does not have overall responsibility of security and does not give
directions to the military personnel, he is exempted from liabilities. For example,
as in the case of Enrica Lexie where the navy was providing security for the
vessel, this meant that the navies acted under the directions of the state, thus the
Captain of the ship was not held liability along with the navy personnel.
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Privately armed security personnel have a contractual relationship with the
ship owner for a specified period of time. During this period of time on board, the
Master has the overall responsibility as per article 34.1 of SOLAS. For example
given that the security personnel has fatally injured a pirate, then the Master may
also be subjected to legal implications.

Concluding Remarks
From the above definitions, it is clarified that the writer intends to explore the
possibility of arming civilian seafarers.

3.3. Rationale for Arming of Civilian Seafarers
Fundamental Rights to Safety
The Magna Carta was developed in the 13th century and represented the
first fundamental human rights instrument. The 1689 English Bill of Rights, the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, followed by the French
Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, were among
other examples of early human rights tools.118/119 On December 10, 1948, the
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted and declared the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.120 The UN Declaration of Human Rights
speaks to the equality, respect, peace, freedom and justice of all members of the
118
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human family. Article 3 in particular states that everyone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person.121
As a part of the human race, a seafarer has the right to life; freedom from
torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment; freedom from coerced labour;
freedom from discrimination, and a right to legal remedy and access to justice. As
an employee, the seafarers under article IV of the MLC, has a right to a safe and
healthy working conditions among other things. 122 In the preparatory texts, it has
been evidenced that the existing methods intended for the suppression of piracy,
armed robbery and maritime terrorism have drawbacks which prevents their
effectiveness. Thus seen as the seafarer is entitled to this right of safety and at
present this is not being done, perhaps the seafarers should be allowed to protect
themselves. Currently there are no applicable laws that forbade arming of
seafarers. In fact, merchant ships are vindicated to protect themselves at sea
against an illegal impending attack within the limits of necessity and
proportionality. Protection of a seafarer’s fundamental rights may be one
justifiable reason to arm the crew.123

Fulfilling the Basic Need for Security
Often time seafarers feel defenceless in the face of imminent danger. This
could have negative implications on the seafarer. For example, a seafarer knowing
that the next planned route will see the vessel traversing some of the high risk
areas such as the Horn of Africa, may become anxious of the possible threats to
his wellbeing. This may in turn affect the productivity of the seafarer. In April
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2009, an American Captain, Richard Phillips was rescued from Somali pirates.
During the rescue operation three (3) Somali pirates were killed. This led to
threats of vengeance on the next American seafarer captured. This situation
resurrected the long standing debates on whether a crew member should be armed.
Barker Parker, a shipping consultant in New York and former ship broker,
envisaged that internal agreements would be drafted to permit captains to keep
firearms and distribute them in times of potential danger from pirates.124 Captain
Phillips, albeit his acknowledgment that using arms on board is a sensitive issue,
supports that senior members of the crew should have access to weapons that can
be used in dire straits. This statement could have been fuelled by his previous
misfortune or it could be the need to feel secured.125
Extended Hostage Situations
In January 2011, the M/V Leopard was hijacked by pirates who took the
crew consisting of two Danes and four Filipinos. Twenty eight months after the
crew was still being held captive. In 2010, the M/V Albedo was hijacked and the
crew held for over one year; in 2011 an article was released giving hope that the
hostages would have soon seen freedom126, however, after two (2) years and nine
(9) months, the seafarers are still left at the mercies of their hijackers127. The ship
sunk in July, 2013 subsequent to which four (4) persons of the fifteen (15) crew
members went missing. The latest reports on this incident informed that the
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Iranian owner has fled. Seven Pakistani sailors were rescued as a result of a
generous endowment from their fellow countrymen; the remaining crew members
from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Iran and India have had no such benefactor. At
present, the European Union naval forces have been patrolling the waters
neighbouring the M/V Albedo’s sunken hull.128

Though their presence has

deterred pirate attacks, their mandate does not extend to rescue operations. The
question is what will become of these remaining seafarers? Who will now step in
and ensure their safe return home? The foregoing situation is a tell-tale sign that
duties and responsibilities are not always fulfilled. As mentioned in chapter 2, the
flag state is responsible to ensure that seafarers remain safe. In the above case,
these sailors are subject to whatever ill-fated future their captors have in mind for
them. If protection is not being given as ought to, then perhaps this justifies yet
another reason why sailors should be given the opportunity to protect themselves.
Inhumane Treatment
A bitter association with being held hostage is the inhumane treatment that
sometimes occurred. Ocean Beyond Piracy reported that in 2011, 1206 seafarers
taken hostage were mistreated and in some instances extremely abused. 129 The
report revealed that 35 seafarers died after being held hostages; while 8 were
killed by pirates after being taken captive, a further 8 died from disease and
malnourishment while being held captive; and 19 died while being used as
human shields during hostage rescue efforts130 (see Chapter 2, Human Costs of
Piracy). A tale of a seafarer, Rathore read:
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“They kept us in a state of terror – we were beaten constantly with metal poles. I
managed to avoid the worst violence, but I saw my crewmates being thrashed
with sticks and having electric probes attached to their genitals, and one man was
suspended by ropes from the ship’s mast for several hours. Even when I could
not see the torturing, I could hear the screams. I can still hear the screams to this
day.”131

It is believed that if seafarers attempt to defend themselves and fail, this
could lead to them feeling the “wrath” of the pirates.
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At present it would seem

as though the sailors are feeling the wrath of pirates in any given situation. To add
to an already horrendous situation, seafarers in some instances are further
victimized by the very companies they work for. Liz McMahon wrote about the
incongruences between survivors of piratical attacks and the treatment received
from employers. The report reveals that seafarers are often refused reimbursement
for personal belongings lost during hijackings, loss of pay and coerced
resignations as such 31% of sailors who have been captured does not plan to
return to sea ( see figure 10).133
Limited Protection under Flags of Conveniences
Another notable detractor is aligned with the use of flag of conveniences or
open registries. Flags of conveniences are used because of their attractive
incentive packages such as tax breaks; however, in many cases these registries
lack the ability and resources to effectively protect the crew under their flags. It
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should be noted that it is the flag state’s responsibility to protect the crew under
its flags.
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Figure 10. Financial Hardships Experienced by Seafarers After a Piracy Incident

For example Antigua and Barbuda does not have the required resources to protect
the ships bearing its flag.

Concluding Remarks
There are a plethora of shortcomings in the minefield of maritime security
leads the author back to its position of why the protection of those at risk maybe
better left up to the seafarer themselves. One maxim said “when the flag states
and coastal states have failed in their mandate to protect against acts of on sea
134
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violence, then the last resort is self-defence by merchant ships”135. Direct arming
of the crews would provide reliable and timely defence mechanisms; reduce the
associated cost of anti-piracy strategies and most of all give seafarers more
secured feeling. As seen earlier in the case of MV Magellan Star, the ship was
being escorted by a naval vessel, prior to losing contact at sea. This made the
vessel vulnerable to the impending hijacking. This evidenced that direct arming of
the crew would be more readily reliable than expected naval enforcement support.
Moreover as mentioned before, 50,000 vessels traverse the Malacca Straits
annually carrying an estimated one third of the world’s trade;136 additionally
20,000-30,000 ships ply through the Gulf of Aden yearly; it becomes almost
impossible to provide the corresponding number of warships needed to escort
these vessels through these high-risked areas.137 Thus, the ratio of warship to
merchant ships is disparate. Furthermore, it is quite costly to use naval forces as
escorts with military protection equalling approximately 2.9 million per day (see
breakdown in figure 8 and 9). It is anticipated that soon many states will not be
able to render this assistance. Given the high associated costs and the limited
numbers of vessels, it is only natural that despite international agreements,
countries may only be able to protect their commercial vessels.138
Being without protection leaves seafarers susceptible to pirate attacks and
fosters the vulnerability leaving them open to hijackings and the possibility of
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being taken hostages. As seen in the above text, 31% of seafarers have decided
not to return to the sea. Perhaps these are valid reasons for allowing civilian
seafarers to try protecting themselves or perhaps these are deterrents to the
profession at seafaring.

3.4. Flag States that are Employing Armed Guards/Non-Military
Personnel/Military/Armed Civilian Seafarers
This section will look at flags states that allow arming vessels. UNCLOS
is the regulatory body for all activities on the high sea. However article 94(1) of
UNCLOS states that each flag must exercise jurisdiction over the ships that fly its
flag.

139

Therefore, the guidelines governing the carriage of artilleries are that of

the flag state; however, upon reaching the coastal waters of another state, the
jurisdiction of that state will so apply. On this basis, a state may forbid the
entrance of arms of any kind, even though it is allowed under the flag state.140
Some countries should as France and Spain require a licence for arms. A
declaration of security as per the tenets of ISPS 5.1 is needed to state that the ship
is carrying guns in several countries such as Kenya and Brazil to name a few. The
United Kingdom has provided specific guidelines for the use of armed guards on
board Britain flagged ships. Similarly, island states such as St. Vincent and the
Grenadines has permitted the use of armed guards on board their ships. Australia
along with South African countries require that all firearms must be registered,
which in reality means that overseas vessels cannot bring weapons into the
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country. In 2011 two masters were arrested and charged for breaching the South
African Firearm Control Act.141
Following the Maersk Alabama incident, the United States issued an
advisory informing that vessels flagged under their state, may use deadly force to
defend themselves in the eye of impending danger. However, this recourse should
be action under the direction of the master. The advisory further states that
seafarers are not legally required to retreat, or use warning shots prior to using
deadly force.142
Concluding Remarks
It should be noted that the above mentioned countries have taken the
initiative to arm its crew through the use of military protection or privately armed
security guards.

However, the International Ship and Port Facility Security

(ISPS) Code necessitates that all vessels that have been flagged in a state that is
party to SOLAS 1974 must put in place a safety plan specific to each vessel.
These procedures are not rigid, thus the carriage and or use of firearms for selfdefence is not forbidden.143 In that said vein, Israel is one country that is believed
to have taken the initiative to directly arm its crew.144
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3.5. Legal Justification of Arming Civilian Seafarers
Despite the existing international laws such as UNCLOS, SUA, SOLAS,
ISPS and the numerous IMO Resolutions addressing maritime security, the
unlawful acts still thrives because of the inadequacies within the legal systems.145
The international legal system of interference rights and counter measures is still
riddled with gaps and thus is part of the problem.146 At present, there are no
specific laws relating to armed seafarers, thus the aim of this section is to provide
the legal implications of having armed seafarers on board and to ascertain whether
under the existing laws arming of seafarers is justifiable.

The Arming Seafarers and International Instruments
UNCLOS
As mentioned earlier, maritime piracy is one of the major threats to
maritime security and the most prevailing crimes in the present time. The crime of
piracy is dealt with by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) particularly articles 100 to 107 and 110. However there are some
provisions that can be interpreted and hence forth apply and justify the arming of
seafarers while others cannot. One such provision which cannot justify the
position of arming is article 105 of UNCLOS. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides
that a State may seize a pirate ship, or a ship taken by piracy under the control of
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. As it can be
deduced from the aforesaid provision, the power to seize ships in the event of
piracy belongs only to the State and not to civilians. Therefore, the said provision
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cannot be used as a basis for arming seafarers or deploying armed security. Thus
this provision though, it governs piracy, will not be examined.
Reservation of peaceful purposes on the high seas under UNCLOS
Although article 105 cannot be used to justify the arming of seafarers,
reference can be made to articles 88 of UNCLOS in relation to articles 98 and
100147 thereof.
Article 88 of UNCLOS provides that the “high seas shall be reserved for
peaceful purposes”, article 98 particularly paragraph 1(b) thereof requires the
master of a ship to render assistance and rescue persons in distress and finally
article 100 requires the cooperation of all State in the repression of piracy on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.148
In order to reserve the high seas for peaceful purposes, article 100 of
UNCLOS can be used to complement article 88 thereof. The State is required to
cooperate under article 100 in order to repress piracy and this cooperation can be
manifested when there is a noticeable effort to accomplish the purpose. Thus, in
order to accomplish article 88 and comply with article 100 of UNCLOS, a State
may domestically legislate laws that will address piracy and other maritime
related offences and provide for the preventive measures that can be used to
combat piracy or maritime terrorism; these preventive measures may include the
arming of seafarers.149
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Moreover, article 98 allows the master of a ship to rescue persons in
distress. The manner of how to rescue the person in distress was not specifically
provided therein, therefore rescue may include employing the use of force if and
when necessary. The possible implication is that, the use of force may entail
criminal liability and sanctions. Considering the foregoing premises, articles 88,
98 and 100 warrant the arming of seafarers, and this premise can be further
buttressed by article 91 of UNCLOS.150

Nationality of Ships under UNCLOS
Article 91 of UNCLOS reads “every State shall fix the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships….” The nationality of ships is governed by
UNCLOS, and under article 91 thereof, the State is given the power to prescribe
the grounds on which it will attach its nationality to a ship. Therefore a State may
prescribe the terms and conditions for arming seafarers to its Flag State ships.
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that arming seafarers is not as easy as it may seem
as the ship moves from place to place. For example a ship moves from the high
seas to the territorial jurisdiction of another State, this may therefore result in
complexities in the application of legal rules. It is so as, even if the State allows
its Flag State ship to arm seafarers, in other jurisdictions where the ship operates,
the carriage of firearms may be prohibited and therefore may become illegal.
Furthermore the ship will be subjected to that State’s law and jurisdiction as it can
only sail under the flag of one State as provided by Article 92 of UNCLOS which
states that:
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“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this
Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high
seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of
call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of
registry.”
As earlier mentioned, in some jurisdiction the carriage of firearms is
prohibited and therefore is considered illegal. In this regard, there could be a
number of possible insurance liability issues to consider in which the ship owners
must concern themselves with. Section 41 of the English Marine Insurance Act
(MIA)151 of 1906 provides that every voyage is lawful and that voyage will be
carried out in a lawful manner. This article refers to implied warranty. Thus, an
implied warranty is breached when the carriage of firearms become unlawful, and
when there is breach of implied warranty the insurer is therefore discharged from
any insurance liability.

SUA Convention and ISPS Code
As can be observed from the above-mentioned discussion, UNCLOS,152
particularly articles

100-107 and 110 only covers the crime of piracy. Thus

subsequent to the Achille Lauro incident, there were no existing laws that covered
the crime of hijacking, as such the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
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Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (SUA Convention)153 was enacted
to cover all forms of maritime violence, which also includes the crime of piracy.

While SUA defines other maritime crimes, however it can be gleaned therefrom that
SUA is more focus on establishing jurisdiction on how to prosecute perpetrators. Nevertheless,
article 13 paragraph 1(a) states that:
“States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offenses as set forth in articles 3
by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the
commission of those offenses within or outside their jurisdiction.”
Article 13 paragraph 1 (a) of SUA Convention must be read in relation to
the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as the former
Convention provides that a State Party shall take all practicable measures to
prevent the commission of maritime offenses. The ISPS Code provides for the
number of preventive measures to combat maritime offenses. The ISPS Code is a
consolidated guidance on the implementation of the security-related amendments
to the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 SOLAS
Convention.154
The ISPS Code prescribes a “special measures to be used to enhance
maritime security” which is referred to as Maritime Security Measures (MSM).155
Accordingly, MSM was developed in response to perceived terrorist threats, and
are also applicable to countering other forms of security threats, notably piracy
153
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and armed robbery in international and territorial waters.156 Thus, the principal
purpose of the ISPS Code can be considered to reduce the vulnerability of the
maritime industry to security threats, regardless of their measures157.
Section 9.1 Part A provides that “each ship shall carry on board a Ship
Security Plan (SSP) approved by the Administration. The plan shall make
provision for the three security levels as defined in the said Code. SSP as defined
in Paragraph 4, Section 2.1, Part A of ISPS Code is a plan developed to ensure the
application of measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board,
cargo transport units and ship’s stores or the ship from the risks of a security
incident.

As it can be inferred therefrom, the ship company may use various kinds
of security measures, including the carriage of firearms as the enumerations given
under Section 9 and sub-sections 9.1 to 9.8 are neither exclusive nor prescriptive.
Furthermore, under ISPS Code, a State may enact full implementation of the
MSM and may provide for regulations on the carriage of firearms on-board as a
form of security measure. Thus, SUA Convention and ISPS Code empower the
State to provide preventive measures, thus, the arming seafarers can be considered
as preventive measure and may likewise be considered as anticipatory selfdefence.

Another security measure that the State may prescribe is with regard to the
training of seafarers. Section 2.9.8 of ISPS Code provides that “the STCW Code
recognizes that shipboard personnel are not security experts, thus they should
156
157
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receive adequate training so as to acquire the required competencies to perform
their assigned duties and collectively contribute to the enhancement of maritime
security.” Accordingly, STCW Convention and STCW Code establish a
mandatory minimum requirement for security-related training and instruction for
all SSOs and shipboard personnel serving on SOLAS ships.158 Thus the same
training may likewise be provided with seafarers who intend to be armed and hold
security duties. Further, the State may legislate additional training to make the
seafarers competent to use and carry firearms.

IMO Resolutions
The Private Security Contractors (PSCs) like armed seafarers are civilians
in nature. The frequent attacks of Somali pirates led many private shipping
companies to hire PSCs. At present it can be said that PSCs is internationally
accepted as a matter of practice, however the armed seafarers are yet to be
recognized by the international law. In most countries, however, weapons are
banned; they are confiscated or secured in a holding area before a ship can enter a
port.
The IMO recognizing that the existence of PSCs and the need to regulate
the same has issued MSC.1 Circ. 1405 on 25 May 2012. The said Resolution
provides for a revised interim guidance to ship owners, ship operators and
shipmaster on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)
on board ships in the high risk area. According to Paragraph 1.3, the purpose of
the said guidance is to assist ship owners, ship operators and shipmasters on the
use of PCASP in order to provide protection against piracy. Further the IMO,
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under paragraph 1.1 of the said Circular recognized the increasing threat to
commercial shipping by Somalia-based pirates and the difficulty to identify
reliable professional private providers of armed security, hence the issuance of the
subject Circular.

As can be inferred therefrom, IMO has recognized the need for the
deployment of PCASP as this is one of the effective measures being employed by
most shipping companies to combat piracy. As deployment of PCS is considered
as one of the preventive measures to combat maritime offenses, thus in the same
vein, arming of seafarers can likewise be considered as preventive measure, hence
the author is of the view that IMO may in the future enact resolutions that will
regulate the arming of seafarers as some countries like Israel is starting to arm
their seafarers.

Resolution 2020 and 2015 provides for a twelve (12) month extension of
authorization given under Resolution 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008) to States and
regional organizations cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal
Government to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “ all necessary means”
to fight piracy. Necessary means may include the use of force, and use of force
may include the use of firearms, and when it includes the use of firearms
consequently it can arm seafarers. However reading from the wording of the said
Resolutions, it can be inferred therefrom that these Resolutions are only
applicable to Somali pirates and not to other pirates.
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Concluding Remarks
Though the laws are not specific to seafarers, the natures of the provisions
governing maritime security are open for interpretations. In justifying the position
to arm, the writer has sought to find the loopholes through which arming of
civilian seafarers could be permitted. Hence based on the forgoing, it can be
concluded that arming of seafarers is justifiable under the international
instruments.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSEQUENCES OF ARMING SEAFARERS

Training Requirements under STCW/ISPS
The ability to fully evaluate a situation before reacting may come with
some level of training. This would be important if one should consider the arming
of civilian seafarers. How much training would these persons need to safely
operate, what level of training would be needed; how often would the need to retrain or obtain re-certification to use a gun be, what are the associated cost of
training and who would undertake the bills for training. Even so what amount of
training would be needed to equip civilian seafarers with the necessary skills to
coherently appraise a situation before acting; bearing in mind that some actions
could lead to law suits against the company and possible criminal charges for the
seafarer. The 2008, International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Manila amendments
incorporated new requirements for security training with the primary purpose of
integrating Ship Security Officer (SSO) on board. This training is as a result of
the ISPS Code implementation, which aims to dissuade and thwart threats and to
mitigate the effects of security incidents.159 Notwithstanding, these security tasks
and training are surety to the primary functions of a seafarer as a navigator or
engineers. Hence, it is believed that the training does not provide the aptitude
similar to that of security professionals who are so trained to detect, divert,
suspend and counteract targets.160 Not to be confused as this basis was also used
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as a justifiable means of arming, however, given that the STCW, did not explicitly
provide guidelines on the qualifications and training for armed seafarers, but
seafarers in general, this could also be translated to mean that seafarers though
being trained as Ship Security Officers (SSO) are not being trained in combat or
weapons training161 similarly it could be interpreted otherwise.
One other disadvantage of being untrained for combat is that expertise
maybe lacking to efficiently and successfully be engaged in gun exchange.
Stakeholders worry that the crew could be killed instead of held for ransom if they
have engaged in unsuccessful battles with pirates.162 In addition, specifically with
regard to Somalia, there is a widespread concern that the use of force will lead to
an escalation of violence in a region where pirates have, for the most part, avoided
inflicting injury on their victims. Additionally there are fears that arming of
seafarers who are also inadequately trained may cause injury to members of the
crew, as well as, themselves.163
Liability and Criminal Sanctions
Criminal liabilities may arise out of what may be perceived as justifiable
actions as in the case of the Enrica Lexie, where two Italian Marines have been
charged with murder after acting against what they perceived as a potential
threat164. In 2012, two Italian marines who were apart of the Italian anti-piracy
coalition allegedly killed two Indian fishermen mistaking them for pirates. There
have been other incidents in which there were no impending prosecutions such as
161
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the Suez Canal shooting in 2008, where three boats were approaching a cargo
vessel, the Global Patriot; following three warning shots two of the three vessels
retreated except one which coincidentally had a cigarette vendor on board. The
security team mistaking the vendor for a potential threat shot and killed the 28
year old Egyptian seller.165

Prohibited From Entering Ports
Weaponries pose legal complications as they are forbidden on some
merchant ships, as well as, in some ports around the world. In 2010, the Suez
Canal became one such entity that forbade this practice.166 As mentioned earlier
in the preceding texts, because the ship is a floating device and navigates
numerous ports around the world, upon reaching ports that under their jurisdiction
carriage of firearm is prohibited, the ship will not be granted access unless under
5.1 of the ISPS code a Declaration of Security (DOS) was prior sent
communicating that the ship is so armed.

Attracting Criminal Intent and Elements
As a matter of safety, it is questioned whether ships carrying weapons may
attract potential criminals aiming to stealing these artilleries.167 In the same vein
it could also harbour thoughts of criminal intents, such as in the case of M/V Myre
Seadiver where 15 Russian seafarers were detained and charged in Nigeria with
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illegal importation of arms, ammunition and for not declaring the contents of the
ship. A bail bond of $500,000.00 was also placed on the vessel.168 Why would
this be? If permission is given to place arms on board merchant ships for
protection of the ship, it makes the ship vulnerable to illegal activities; some
seafarers may get the idea of smuggling illegal guns and ammunition amongst the
legitimate lot. This could lead to the practice of gun trafficking as well.

The Ability of Seafarers to Bear Arms
Finally, aside from the criminal and civil liability that self-defence attracts,
one pertinent question would be, are civilian seafarers capable of killing
someone? If given the force to protect themselves, would they be ready to fight
for their lives and be able to live with the aftermath? Martin169 relays the story
where a crew member was evidently disturbed by actions of the military coalition
securing their ship. In the same experience Martin explained that the cook on the
other hand appeared to be untroubled by the events. While this experience is not
one in the same as the crew actually inflicting the injuries, the results of the ability
to cope with such experiences are the similar.
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Rest Hours and Manning Levels are Limited
Regulation 2.3 of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006170 speaks about
the hours of rest and work periods that must be respected. In that regards it is
noted that seafarers are already too busy with their schedules to effectively
undertake the responsibility of protecting themselves and the ship through the use
of arms. Therefore the consequences of arming would add additional stress to
their already busy lives. Mejia wrote:
“prevailing manning levels and the demanding nature of shipboard life are
also factors that limit the options available to ship crews in dealing with security
threats. Crews have simply become too small and too busy to offer any sort of
realistic protection against a human intelligence actively seeking to subvert the
ship to its wicked purpose”171

Concluding Remarks
From the aforesaid texts, it can be deduced that though arming of the crew
may be justified in wake of the current situation surrounding these noble artisans.
The above text has provided some instances in which arming of seafarers may
have direct consequences such as being held criminally liable for injuries inflicted
or the killing of persons at sea (be it pirates or fishermen or other users of the sea)
. Additionally carrying arms proves to impede security measures as such ships
may not be admitted in ports. Furthermore, seafarers are already too busy to be
170
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burdened with the responsibility of bearing arms to protect themselves and their
ships.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Concluding Remarks on Piracy and the Responses to Suppress the Crime
The international laws governing maritime security have noticeable pitfalls
which impede their ability to combat illegal acts at sea including maritime
terrorism, armed robbery and piracy. Earlier in this dissertation, the evolution of
piracy was examined for the purposes of illustrating that the archaic definition of
piracy could no longer matched the contemporary practice of pirates today.
UNCLOS definition of piracy under article 101 does not provide the legal basis
for crimes that have taken place as close as 11.55 NM from shore. It should be
reiterated that in order for piracy to be considered under the international regime,
it must be conducted on the high seas. Furthermore, pirates are captured but not
prosecuted and thereafter release. For example because of the loopholes embedded
within the treaties, prosecutors may have a difficult task to indict pirates.
Additionally the issue of gathering evidence for prosecution proves to be a long
task and pirates just as any other human being has the right to fair treatment and
judicial process. Hence they cannot be detained for a long period of time without
being charged. These loopholes also help to foster the crime of piracy. As seen
earlier in the paper, the earnings generated from piratical activities compensate
67-157 times more than the best earning option in Somalia. This firstly provides
the encouragement for partaking in the crime and secondly seen as in most cases
pirates are not prosecuted, this also offers an incentive to continue with the crime.
Moreover if this trend is continued, under the existing suppression methods, this
may never deter perspective pirates.
As a result, the crime is amplifying in different regions. As seen earlier in
this dissertation, the crime was believed to have started with the Greeks and has
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over decades spread to the once docile West Africa and at present it has
manifested in the Horn of Africa.
The maritime community believes that the passive approaches are best in
the fight against piracy as they do not aggravate an already escalated situation.
The Best Management Practices are believed to be the safer options for securing
the crew and ensuring safety to vessels traversing the high risk areas. Some
persons are of the impression that the BMP is merely a communication campaign,
others believe that it is an inexpensive method of providing security without
taking into consideration the effectiveness of said security methods. In
furtherance, it is believed that active defence should be left up to the naval forces,
but as repeatedly mentioned, there are not enough warships to match the number
of merchant ships traversing the trade channels.

Concluding Remarks on Arming of Seafarers
In iteration, there are no legally binding laws preventing the direct arming
of seafarers. As was mentioned, it is not unlawful to carry firearms, as the right to
arm a vessel is vested in the flag states. Seen as the ship is governed under the
jurisdiction of the flag state, it has the power to determine whether its vessel
should be armed on the high seas. The problem arises because the ship is a
floating device. Hence as it moves from different ports across the globe, it enters
into the jurisdiction of different countries which may prohibit the carriage of
firearms on board.
Admittedly arming of the crew may present a more pragmatic solution due
to the inability of the current relevant treaties and other practical solutions being
used to repel the acts of piracy and other illegal acts at sea. With reference to the
preceding texts, the inhumane treatment of seafarers signifies a desperate call for
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more consistently active measures to be employed in combating piracy and other
on-sea violence.
Notwithstanding the facts, the writer believes that the protection of any
civilian ought to be left up to the relevant competent authorities. Hence seafarers
should not be armed. For the reason that there are no clear guidelines determining
how a civilian seafarer will be treated given that in the course of protecting his or
herself have in the process injured or fatally wounded a pirate. If this action
should be justified, it may be on the premise of self defence. Even so self defence
is a complicated issue for the mere fact that what may constitute self defence in a
particular country may differ in another state. Hence seafarers may be subjected
to criminal implications. For example in the Enrica Lexie case, the two Italian
militaries, though they acted out of perceived defence of the ship, they were
subjected to criminal charges under the Indian Law.172

Though the afore

mentioned case included navies, the essence remains the same, the laws
governing another country is different from those of the flag states. Therefore if a
civilian seafarer or armed security forces or naval force killed or injured a person
then the criminal laws of that country may apply and the civilian seafarers could
be faced with murder charges under the penal system of foreign laws. 173 Palmer
wrote:
“The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in its M/V Saiga No 2
judgment, which related to naval personnel, said that ‘international law …
requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force
is inevitable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the
circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as
172

Palmer, A (2012) The Use of Armed Guards, Legal and Practical Issues accessed from
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they do in other areas of international law.’ The judgment further suggests that
practices which are normally followed before resorting to force must be used.
These include both visual and auditory signals such as firing shots across the
bows, and a variety of other measures.”174

Consequently ships’ Captains may not approve of arms on the ship they
are masters of as criminal and civil consequences extend to not only the
perpetrator but the Captains and ship owners as well. This is so as under SOLAS
34.1, the Captain has the overall responsibility, hence equally he would be held
responsible for any criminal liability.
Furthermore, the author has had the privilege to discuss this issue at length
with seafarers at various levels in their professional career ranging from a current
serving ship’s captain, second and third officers, cadets, navigation and
engineering officer, industry players from prominent companies, and the
conclusion at all levels and diaspora remained in line with that of the author’s.
Civilian seafarers should not be armed. The common perception amongst these
persons is that armed civilian seafarers are likely to turn on each other in times of
conflicts and disagreements. Many went on to explain that a ship though a huge
vessel, becomes quite a small space to share with people of diverse, cultures,
backgrounds and practices. They believe that misunderstandings and rivalries are
inevitable at some point, and that arms on board would be a foreseeable time
bomb. Some persons were of the impression that select members of the team,
mainly the Master could carry this weapon. It is the view that this would not be of
much effectiveness in light of the heavy artilleries being carried by pirates.
However, it is the writer’s believe that these sailors would have more to lose than
to gain by being armed.

174

ibid
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Recommendations
It is recognized that amending the legal documents such as UNCLOS may not
be a readily solution. Looking at the original adoption of the document, it took 12
years for the instrument to be implemented. Hence to amend and accept a more
contemporize version may take another 12 years. Hence the recommendations are
as follows:
 find ways of remedying the definition inefficiencies in UNCLOS and
SUA Conventions. This may be done by means of a supplementary
documents or chapters. In this way pirates can be duly prosecuted for the
crimes they are committing on the world’s oceans.
 Establish a national insurance fund for seafarers. This would also ensure
that seafarers are not held hostages in hostile environments for longer than
necessary. For example, by doing this seafarers would no longer have to
wait on ship owners or operators to post their ransoms, as a scheme would
readily be available for that purpose. The scheme would be reimbursed by
the ship owners and or operators accordingly.
In chapter one of the overview, it was mentioned that in order for a crime to
be eradicated, the root cause must first be eliminated. If this is done, then the need
for active measures such as arming of seafarers or use of militaries and private
security guards may become null and void. Some companies have taken a step in
this direction. Oceans Beyond Piracy reported that since early 2013, members of
the shipping fraternity including K Line, Maersk Line, Stena, NYK Line, Mitsui
OSK Line, Shell and BP have contributed $1 million dollars in support of job
creation and capacity building projects in Somalia. The group has pledged a
further $1.5 million to fund those same efforts. “175

175

http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop2012final.pdf

83

Perhaps this is the first step in remedying the problems in Somalia and
other trouble areas.
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